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THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN STATE
INCOME TAXES AND
LOCAL PROPERTY TAXES:
EDUCATION FINANCE IN
NEW JERSEY
TIMOTHY J. GOODSPEED *
Abstract - New Jersey enacted an
income tax in 1976 in response to a
State Supreme Court ruling that held
that local taxation alone violated the
requirement of the State Constitution
that all children receive a “thorough
and efficient” education. The law
required that revenues from the income
tax be dedicated solely to relief of local
property taxes. Most of the relief is
given as aid to local school districts. This
paper offers both a theoretical and an
empirical analysis of the effect on local
property taxes of changes in aid
resulting from the 1990 increase in the
income tax enacted under Governor Jim
Florio and the beginning of the 1994
decrease in income taxes enacted under
Governor Christine Whitman. The
theoretical analysis is based on general
equilibrium models developed over the
previous two decades. The results
indicate (1) a flypaper effect for both
increases and decreases in aid, which
may be more pronounced for decreases,
and (2) that higher income districts
choose to increase property taxes more
than other districts when the income tax
is reduced.
INTRODUCTION
The state of New Jersey has undergone
several recent changes in its income tax
system. These changes, and the history
of the New Jersey income tax, are linked
to court decisions that have mandated
that the state provide aid to local school
districts. After the New Jersey Supreme
Court ruled in Robinson v. Cahill (1973)
that local taxation alone violated the
requirement of the State Constitution
that all children receive a “thorough and
efficient” education, then Governor
Brendan Byrne responded by proposing
a statewide income tax in 1976 to raise
funds for aid to local school districts.
The income tax proposed by Governor
Byrne became law only after the New
Jersey Supreme Court closed public
schools in response to the Legislature’s
initial failure to approve the tax. The
state aid system has since undergone a
*Department of Economics, Hunter College and CUNY
Graduate Center, New York, NY 10021.
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series of changes reflecting the back
and forth debate between elected
officials and the State Supreme Court.
The most recent changes include a
large increase in the income tax and a
restructuring of aid to local school
districts by then Governor Jim Florio in
1990, again in response to a court
mandate. Governor Christine Whitman
was elected in 1994 in part on a
platform of cutting taxes, and Governor
Whitman instituted a series of cuts in
the state income tax beginning in
1994.
The law creating an income tax in New
Jersey required that revenues from the
New Jersey income tax be dedicated
solely to relief of local property taxes; no
income tax revenues in New Jersey are
general revenue funds. Income tax
revenues provide property tax relief in
three major ways: aid to local school
districts, aid to municipalities, and a
homestead rebate. (In New Jersey, local
school districts and municipalities are
separate entities.) Of these, by far the
most important is aid to local school
districts. Typically, about 80 percent of
income tax revenues are given as aid to
local school districts, 10 percent as aid
to municipalities, and 10 percent in the
form of homestead rebates.1
Changes in the income tax therefore
have direct implications for local
financing decisions; indeed, the implica-
tions of a cut in the income tax for local
property taxes was a primary focus of
the 1994 gubernatorial campaign. The
fear on the part of some is that the
state income tax cuts will simply lead to
dollar for dollar increases in local
property taxes. A tremendous amount
of political attention has been paid to
this public policy issue, and the
economics literature on local public
finance is extremely relevant to this
question.
In particular, three strands of literature
are particularly important. First, since
most of the income tax revenue in New
Jersey is returned to school districts in
the form of grants, the empirical
literature that studies the response of
lower levels of government to grants
from higher levels of government is
relevant. Second, a recent offshoot of
the grants literature examines whether
increases and decreases in aid have
symmetric effects. Third, since changes
in New Jersey have been mandated by
the State Supreme Court, the argument
advanced by Fischel (1989), that the
interaction between voters’ decisions
and court mandates is important in
understanding school district financing
issues, is relevant.
Consider first the literature that studies
the response of lower levels of govern-
ment to grants from higher levels of
government. A typical finding in the
empirical literature on this subject is that
lump-sum grants from higher levels of
government lead to higher levels of
local spending than if the funds were
collected locally. This empirical result is
known as the “flypaper effect.”2 The
term flypaper effect arose partly
because the empirical result did not
correspond with the economic theory of
grants developed in Bradford and Oates
(1971). Their theoretical work suggested
a correspondence between lump-sum
grants and income; essentially, lump-
sum grants can be viewed as income
changes and should have about the
same impact as a change in income. For
instance, if a local government spends
about five cents of an extra dollar of
income on schools, one would expect
that about five cents of an additional
dollar of grant money received by that
government would be used for schools,
and the other $0.95 would be returned
to taxpayers in the form of lower
property taxes. A typical result of the
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empirical studies is that about $0.40 of
the grant is used for local services,
$0.60 being returned to taxpayers in the
form of lower taxes.
Explanations for the flypaper effect are
many and varied and depend on such
factors as the public choice model by
which public decisions are made and the
price of education faced by voters.
Several reviews are available for the
reader (the most recent being Hines and
Thaler, 1995); we list some of the most
common explanations below. Chernick
(1979), among others, suggests that the
aggregate nature of many studies may
mix matching grants (which have price
effects) with lump-sum grants; since we
expect higher spending out of matching
grants than out of income, this might
explain the flypaper effect. “Fiscal
illusion” models offer a second ap-
proach. For instance, Oates (1979) and
Courant, Gramlich, and Rubinfeld
(1979) suggest that citizens confuse
average and marginal cost so that the
electorate is fooled into thinking that
there is a fall in the price of providing
education and demands a higher level
of education. Another type of fiscal
illusion model emphasizes a local
bureaucracy that is trying to maximize
its budget. By concealing grant funds
(as in Filimon, Romer, and Rosenthal,
1982), voters are again fooled into
thinking that the price of education has
fallen and vote to increase the size of
the budget, which is the goal of local
officials. Another twist is that of Romer
and Rosenthal (1980), who use the idea
of a reversion level discussed in Romer
and Rosenthal (1979). Budget maximiz-
ing bureaucrats offer voters a bloated
school budget; if defeated, the budget
reverts to the previous year’s budget.
The voters may choose the large budget
as the lesser of two evils. Further, Romer
and Rosenthal (1980) argue that lump-
sum grants will increase the reversion
level, which, under certain conditions,
leads to a higher level of spending than
a simple increase in income. A third
explanation, that of Fisher (1979),
suggests that differing tax prices for an
individual between higher and lower
levels of government can lead to a
flypaper effect. Since state aid in New
Jersey is financed by income taxes and
locally raised revenue comes from the
property tax, Fisher’s explanation is
particularly relevant. As we will see, the
tax price for a voter is likely to be
different under these two types of taxes.
A second strand of literature, which
examines whether increases and
decreases in aid have symmetric effects,
is also relevant. Given the direct tie of
income taxes and school aid, increases
in the income tax will result in higher
levels of aid, while income tax cuts will
result in lower levels of aid. Moreover,
the New Jersey grant system was
changed to a foundation system starting
in 1991, and aid to wealthy jurisdictions
was phased out progressively. Because
of these changes, the period since 1991
has seen aid to some school districts
increase, while other school districts
have experienced decreased aid. While
the flypaper effect has usually been
examined for the case of increases in
aid, these changes afford an opportu-
nity to examine the possibility of a
flypaper effect in reverse.
As noted in Gamkhar and Oates (1996),
asymmetric responses to increased and
decreased aid were first suggested in
Gramlich (1987); he thought that it may
be difficult for governments to cut back
on programs with established clienteles
when aid falls. Stine (1994) notes that
an alternative type of asymmetry is fiscal
retrenchment; governments may tighten
their belts when aid is cut back.
Empirically, Stine finds a “super”
flypaper effect, which even reverses the
NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL VOL.  LI  NO. 2
222
expected sign of the aid coefficient; he
finds that lower aid in Pennsylvania
counties led to lower local revenues. In
contrast, Gamkhar and Oates find no
asymmetries in state and local spending
in response to changes in federal grants.
The third strand of literature that is
important in analyzing the New Jersey
case is the argument of Fischel (1989).
He argues that the interaction between
voters and courts is important in
understanding changes in school district
financing in California. Fischel’s hypoth-
esis in a general sense is that court
decisions that attempt to change school
financing, such as Serrano v. Priest
(1971) in California, are often undone
by voters. As we will see, property tax
changes in New Jersey may be partly a
reaction to mandated changes, which
entail gains for some segments of voters
and losses for others.3
This paper investigates the effect on
local property taxes of the increase in
income taxes under Governor Florio and
the beginning of the decrease in income
taxes under Governor Whitman. To do
this, we begin by developing a simple
public choice model in which both local
property taxes and state income taxes
are choice variables, which is based on
the general equilibrium models devel-
oped in Westhoff (1977), Epple, Filimon,
and Romer (1984), and Goodspeed
(1989).4 In doing so, we incorporate
Fisher’s explanation for the flypaper
effect, and we analyze Fischel’s argu-
ment. We also allow the flypaper effect
to operate directly through aid, having a
larger impact on the budget constraint
than income.
This theoretical model is used as the
basis for an estimating equation that
relates school district aid and property
taxes. This equation is then estimated
using disaggregated data on New Jersey
school districts for the fiscal years 1991–
5. The years 1991 to the first half of
1994 reflect the Florio tax increases; the
second half of 1994 and the 1995 data
are the first years of the Whitman tax
cuts. Four empirical specifications are
estimated: a pooled regression, a
regression with district fixed effects, a
long 1991–5 first difference, and a short
1994–5 first difference.
Three results are noteworthy. First, a
flypaper effect seems to be present so
that property taxes fell significantly less
than dollar for dollar when income taxes
were raised, and are likely to rise
significantly less than dollar for dollar
when income taxes are cut. Second, the
theory indicates and the empirical
evidence tends to confirm that higher
income districts will choose greater
decreases in property taxes than other
districts when an undesired income tax
rise is imposed, and will choose to
increase property taxes more than other
districts when the income tax is re-
duced. Third, while there are mixed
results concerning the effect of in-
creases versus decreases in aid, the
specification with district fixed effects,
which is arguably the most complete
specification, indicates that property
taxes rise less when aid decreases than
they fall when aid increases.
The remainder of the paper begins by
developing a theoretical model in the
next section. The third section presents
some aggregate data on income and
property taxes for New Jersey, develops
an empirical model, and presents the
regression results from a disaggregated
data set. The fourth section provides
conclusions.
A THEORETICAL MODEL
The model that is used to describe a
political equilibrium and derive an
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estimating equation is similar to that of
Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1984).5
Individuals will be assumed to derive
utility from consumption of a private
good, x; per-pupil spending on school-
ing, g; and housing, h. Funding for
spending on schools comes from two
sources, a local property tax and aid
from the state. The budget constraint of
a local school district is therefore
where g is per-pupil spending, Hm is the
equilibrium quantity of housing per
capita of the school district, Ph is the
after-tax price of housing, tp is the
property tax rate, A is per-capita aid, E is
the enrollment of the school district,
and N is the population of the school
district. State aid is derived from a state
income tax; suppose that the income
tax is proportional so that
where ty is the income tax rate, Ym is mean
state income, and Am is mean state aid.
Individual i’s budget constraint is
yi(1 – ty) – tpPhh + gA = x + Phh
where g reflects one avenue through
which the flypaper effect may operate.
If g = 0, higher aid will impact the
individual’s budget constraint only
through its effect on equation 1 (and
hence tp), that is, only through the shift
in the school district budget constraint.
If g > 0, a change in aid will have an
additional impact on the individual’s
budget constraint.
We can greatly simplify the presentation
by assuming that an individual first
chooses h to maximize utility subject to
his budget constraint and given g. We
denote the individual’s optimal housing
choice resulting from this problem as h*.
We assume that h* does not depend on
g. The problem that we will focus on is
the choice of the optimal amount of g
and aggregate aid, given h* and the
constraints delineated above. As we will
see, finding the optimal g is equivalent
to finding the optimal tp, which will be
important for our empirical specification.
We will assume a majority rule voting
model in which voters determine one
choice variable taking the other choice
variables as given. As is usual in this type
of model, we assume that indifference
curves have a single-crossing property;
this restriction on preferences together
with serial voting ensures that the
solution to the voting problem can be
found by examining the preferences of a
decisive voter using the usual partial
derivative tools.6
Consider first the optimal choice of g (or
equivalently tp), holding the aggregate
level of aid constant, and given h*. The
preferences of the decisive voter can be
found by maximizing this voter’s utility
subject to the constraints 1, 2, and 3:
Max U(x, g, h*d )
g = tpPhHm 
N
 + ANE E
1
ty = 
Am
Ym
2
3
s.t. yd(1 – ty) – tpPhhd* + gA = x + Phhd*
tpPhHm
N
 + AN = gE E
ty = 
Am
Ym
4
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The first-order condition is again
A graphical depiction of the solution is
also useful and is given in Figure 1,
which plots the tax rate, tp, on the
vertical axis and per-pupil spending, g,
on the horizontal axis. The school
district budget constraint is a straight
line with intercept –A/PhH
m and slope
E/NPhH
m. The usual properties of
indifference curves imply the concave
shape shown. Higher levels of utility are
associated with indifference curves
farther to the southeast. (Recall that tp is
a “bad,” whereas g is a “good.”) The
slope of an indifference curve is
Ug/Uxh*. Diagrams similar to this can be
found in Westhoff (1977), Epple,
Filimon, and Romer (1984), and
Goodspeed (1989). The equilibrium of
the decisive voter is shown in the
diagram as the point at which the slope
of the budget constraint and the slope
of the indifference curve are equal.
As the analysis and the figure make
clear, we could choose g and let tp be
determined by the budget constraint or
choose tp and let g be determined by
the budget constraint. Either way of
looking at the problem results in the
same first-order condition and the same
solution. Since the policy question in
which we are interested is how state aid
affects property taxes, it will be useful in
the empirical section for us to solve the
problem in terms of tax variables rather
than public services.
To endogenize the aggregate amount of
aid at the state level, we simply modify
7 to let the average level of aid be a
where i = d denotes the decisive voter.
Letting the choice variable be g, we can
substitute the second constraint for tp
and the third constraint for ty in the first
constraint, and substitute the first
constraint for x in the utility function to
yield the following equivalent uncon-
strained problem:
The first-order condition is
That is, the decisive voter would like to
set the marginal rate of substitution
between g and x equal to the “price” of
enrollment over population times the
ratio of the decisive voter’s tax base to
the mean tax base.
An alternative and equivalent formula-
tion of the problem is to let tp be the
choice variable, substitute the third
constraint for ty in the first constraint,
and substitute the first constraint for x
and the second constraint for g in the
utility function:
Ug = 
E hd
*
.
Ux N H
m
6
Ug = 
E hd
*
.
Ux N H
m
8
Max
 
U   y  1–
Am
  –  g
E
 
hd
*
  – 
hd
*
 A
+ g A – phhd
* , g, hd
*   .
N Hm HmY mg
5
(( ) )(
)
Max
 
U y  1–  
Am
  – tpPhhd
* + g A
Y mtp
7
– Phhd
* , tpPhH
m 
N
 + A
N 
, hd
*   .
E E )
( )(
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second choice variable in the problem,
and require Am ³  0. The first-order
condition with respect to the average
level of aid is
To easily interpret this condition,
consider a jurisdiction in which the
change in per-capita aid is just equal to
the change in the average level of aid
for the state, so that ¶ A/ ¶ Am is one, and
suppose that there is no flypaper effect
operating through g  so that g  is zero.
We first note that a comparison of
condition 9 (given the above supposi-
tions) and condition 8 indicates that
voters whose incomes relative to the
state average are greater than their
property values relative to the district
average will prefer zero state aid and
hence zero income tax rates. This
illustrates Fisher’s (1979) argument that
aid and locally financed spending may
have different tax prices.7
Fischel’s (1989) argument, that the
interaction between voters and courts is
important in understanding changes in
school district financing in California,
also relates to condition 9. Fischel’s
hypothesis in a general sense is that
court decisions that attempt to change
school financing, such as Serrano v.
Priest (1971) in California, are often
undone by voters.
9
¶ Am
Ug
 £  
E Ym
g
¶ Am
 if < 0, Am = 0.
Ux N ¶ A
y ¶ A–
FIGURE 1. The Equilibrium Level of Property Taxes
tp
tp
*
A– 
PhH
m
A– 
PhH
m
tp =
g
+ 
PhH
m
E
N
U( yd (1 – ty) – tpPhh* + g A – Phh*, g, h*)
Ug
h*Ux
gg*
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To see how Fischel’s (1989) hypothesis
can be analyzed for New Jersey in the
present model, suppose that voters
decide (according to condition 9 for the
decisive voter of the state) to maintain
zero aid, but that a court mandates that
aid (and hence income tax rates) be
positive. What effect does this have on
the optimal choice for tp for a school
district? We can use Figure 1 to see
three effects. First, note from constraint
3 that those who would have opposed
aid (i.e., those whose incomes relative to
the state average are greater than their
property values relative to the district
average) have less income left over to
spend on private goods, x; since lower x
implies higher Ux, the indifference
curves pictured in Figure 1 will become
flatter for those who would have
opposed aid, which implies lower
property taxes. Conversely, those who
would have favored aid realize more x
and hence have steeper indifference
curves. Second, the school district
budget constraint will shift, reflecting
the different level of aid; higher aid
would imply a lower property tax rate.
Third, there may be an additional effect
on the curvature of the indifference
curves if g  ¹  0. If g  > 0 and aid rises, we
again see from constraint 3 that more x
is realized so that the indifference curves
will be steeper than otherwise. (We also
note that, if aid falls, less x is realized
and indifference curves will be flatter
than otherwise.)
Given this as background, we now
consider how the Whitman tax cuts
affect the case of two hypothetical
school districts in New Jersey. Figure 2
FIGURE 2. The Effect of an Income Tax Cut on Property Taxes for a Hypothetical Wealthy School District
U( yd (1 – ty) – tpPhh* + g A – Phh*, g, h*)
A– 
PhH
m
A’– 
PhH
m
tp
tp
*
tp
*’
gg* g*’
A– 
PhH
m
tp =
g
+ 
PhH
m
E
N
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will be used to show the change to the
new equilibrium. Suppose point A
represents the equilibrium (i.e., after the
adjustments of the previous paragraph)
prior to the Whitman tax cuts. Consider
first the case of a relatively wealthy
school district, which would have
favored the tax cut in the sense that the
income of the decisive voter of the
district relative to state average income
is greater than the voter’s property value
relative to the district average. The
indifference curve of the decisive voter
becomes steeper in this district, as
illustrated in Figure 2, which implies a
higher property tax rate. In addition, to
the extent that aid is cut to the wealthy
district, the budget constraint of the
district will shift to the left, also implying
a higher tax rate. Finally, if g  > 0, the aid
cut will also decrease x, and the
indifference curve will consequently
become flatter, indicating a lower
property tax rate. Hence, the flypaper
effect operating through g  implies a
lower property tax rate than otherwise
would result in the event of a cut in aid.
To summarize, two of the three effects
are leading to a higher property tax rate,
while the flypaper effect (operating
through g ) is leading to a lower
property tax rate.
Next consider the case of a relatively
poor school district, which would have
opposed the tax cut in the sense that
the income of the decisive voter of the
district relative to state average income
is less than the voter’s property value
relative to the district average. The
indifference curve of the decisive voter
becomes flatter in this district, which
implies a lower property tax rate. If aid
in this district falls, the budget con-
straint shifts to the left, which implies a
higher property tax rate; the flypaper
effect (operating through g ) would
again make the indifference curves
flatter, dampening any increase in the
property tax. For the poorer district, two
of the three effects are leading to lower
property taxes; only the fall in aid leads
to a higher property tax.
The analysis thus far takes the property
tax base PhH
m as given; this is why the
school district budget constraint remains
unchanged in Figures 1 and 2 and the
equilibrium can be easily represented in
the graph. However, for this to be an
equilibrium, the tax base PhH
m repre-
sented in the figures must be consistent
with equilibrium in the housing market.
This is illustrated in Figure 3, which adds
a supply and demand diagram for the
housing market to the left of the initial
public sector diagram of Figure 1. As the
demand curve for housing depends on
the gross of tax price and supply
depends on the net of tax price, an
increase in the tax rate can be repre-
sented by a downward shift in the
demand curve. This would affect the
public sector diagram as both Ph and H
would fall; as we are taking the popula-
tion as fixed, PhH
m would fall as well.
The slope of the public sector budget
constraint would become steeper and
the intercept would become greater in
absolute value. If the tax base continues
to fall as the tax rate is increased, each
value for tp would be associated with a
slightly steeper budget constraint and
the budget constraint for all tp that are
consistent with equilibrium in the
housing market would become convex.8
The final equilibrium is slightly more
complicated because the indifference
curves are drawn for a given Ph; to the
extent that a change in Ph changes x
and hence Ux, the curvature of the
indifference curves will change.
Our earlier analysis also has not taken
into account the consequences of
migration, which has been a focus of
previous general equilibrium simulations
of policy questions, such as in
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Goodspeed (1989) and Epple and
Romer (1991). Migration may affect the
demand for housing, and thereby the
equilibrium price of housing, and may
change the decisive voter in a school
district. As noted earlier, individual
demand curves for housing, h*, are
assumed not to depend on g. However,
as higher levels of g make the school
district more attractive, the migration of
households into the school district
implies that the market demand for
housing in a school district will depend
on g, since it depends on the number of
households and their income levels. As
the market demand for housing
changes in the school district, the
equilibrium price of housing changes. In
addition, migration could cause a
change in the identity of the decisive
voter, which would cause a different set
of indifference curves to be relevant. As
shown in Westhoff (1977) for an
income tax with no housing market,
Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1984) for a
property tax with a housing market, and
Goodspeed (1989) for an income tax
with a housing market, a migration
equilibrium can be established with the
by now well-known restriction of single-
crossing indifference curves.
EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND RESULTS
Prior to statistically analyzing data on
individual school districts, Figures 4 and
5 present aggregate data on the real
revenue of New Jersey property and
income taxes for 1985–94 and on their
real growth rates, respectively. The
income tax data come from various
issues of the Annual Report of the New
Jersey Division of Taxation. The property
tax data was compiled by the New
A– 
PhH
m
tp =
g
+ 
PhH
m
E
N
FIGURE 3. The Public Sector–Housing Market Equilibrium
tp
tp
*
gg*A– 
PhH
m
Ph(1 + tp
*)
Ph
H
S(Ph)
D(Ph(1 + tp
*))
D(Ph)
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FIGURE 4. Real Revenue of New Jersey Income and Property Tax, 1985–94
FIGURE 5. Real Growth of New Jersey Income and Property Tax, 1985–94
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Jersey Department of Community
Affairs from the County Abstract of
Ratables and includes the three levels of
government that levy property taxes:
school districts, municipal governments,
and county governments. The data are
deflated by the consumer price index
(CPI) to obtain real dollars. From Figure
4, we see that property tax revenue is
over twice that of income tax revenue.
Figure 5 shows that income tax revenue
was quite variable during the period.
Income tax revenue for fiscal year 1987
shows a spike, which resulted from the
increase in the federal tax rate on capital
gains legislated in the 1986 Tax Reform
Act. The second spike, in 1991 and
1992, is the result of the tax increase of
Governor Florio. No obvious relationship
between income taxes and property
taxes is discernible from the figures (and
the correlation coefficient between
income tax revenues and property tax
revenues is not significant). An obvious
problem is the lack of data points.
To investigate the relationship with a
larger number of data points, a disag-
gregated data set was constructed from
audit worksheets filed by individual
school districts with the state. The audit
worksheet is essentially an income
statement of the school district; the
important information for this study
from the audit worksheet is the infor-
mation on local property tax revenues
and state aid by school district, which I
was able to obtain for the years 1991–
95.9 This information is supplemented
by information on population, enroll-
ment, and income. Unfortunately, these
variables were not available for all years
and some years had to be constructed
through interpolation and extrapolation.
The construction of these variables is
detailed in the Appendix. From this
information, a panel data set was
constructed for the years 1991–5. To be
included in the panel, information on a
district had to be available each year.
This resulted in 509 school districts over
the five year period for a total sample
size of 2545. Table 1 presents summary
statistics for these districts by year.
As noted earlier, we can equivalently
view the decisive voter as choosing g
and let tp be determined from the
budget constraint or as choosing tp  and
let g be determined by the budget
constraint. Since we are trying to explain
the effect of aid on property taxes, it
makes the most sense to proceed by
choosing the optimal tp. Given the
optimal tp, t
*
p, we can multiply through
by PhH
m to find the optimal per-capita
property tax selected by the decisive
voter, t*pPhH
m; for notational simplicity,
we relabel this as P.
We will assume throughout that the
decisive voter has mean values for all
relevant variables. The motivation for
this is a data constraint, but it is not
difficult to defend the mean rather than
the median, for instance, as the
TABLE 1
AVERAGES FOR SAMPLE OF 509 NEW JERSEY SCHOOL DISTRICTS
(DOLLAR FIGURES ARE REAL 1982–4 DOLLARS)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Overall
A: per-capita state aid
P: per-capita property tax
y: per-capita income
E/N: enrollment/population
(E/N)(yd /Y
m): income-tax price
aSee the Appendix for details on the construction of these variables.
234
447
9407
0.121
0.0725
200
480
9372a
0.124a
0.0758
209
480
9389a
0.122a
0.0755
255
429
9386
0.121a
0.0723
271
422
9405a
0.119
0.0691
236
425
9482a
0.118a
0.0698
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appropriate statistic to use. Voting
patterns in which the wealthy are more
likely to vote than the poor or a model
of political power in which the wealthy
effectively have more voting power than
the poor implies that the descriptive
statistics of the decisive voter will be
above the median of the population.
Given this and an income distribution
with mean greater than median (such as
a log-normal) implies that the use of
mean values may be more appropriate
than median values.10
Given this background, the theoretical
analysis suggests the following estimat-
ing equation for the optimal P:
where u is a random error term.11 Four
types of regressions will be performed
on this basic model. First, the data are
pooled. Second, the data are first
differenced to incorporate district fixed
effects. Year fixed effects are also added
to these first two specifications. Third, a
long first difference, 1991–5, is exam-
ined. Finally, a short first difference that
incorporates primarily the Whitman
change, 1994–5, is examined. A test for
asymmetry is then conducted by re-
estimating these specifications with the
addition of a dummy variable that
reflects whether a district experienced
an increase or decrease in aid from the
previous year and an interaction term
consisting of the dummy variable
multiplied by per-capita state aid.
Table 2 gives the results from estimation
of the basic model. The first three
columns pertain to the pooled regres-
sion, the next two to the district fixed
effects specification, the sixth column to
the 1991–5 first difference, and the
final column to the 1994–5 first
difference. The first specification of the
pooled regressions includes per-capita
aid, A, per-capita income, yd, and per-
capita enrollment, E/N, on the right-
hand side. The second column adds the
income tax price, (E/N)(yd /Y
m), as
another explanatory variable. The third
column adds to this year dummy
variables.
The results of the first of these regres-
sions yields a point estimate for per-
capita aid of –0.84 (with an extremely
significant t-statistic of –35). The point
estimate falls to –0.76 with the addition
of the income-tax price variable. While
this is a larger impact than one would
expect from a change in income, it is
smaller than previous estimates of the
flypaper effect.12 Dummy variables for
years, which are included in column 3,
are significant for 1992 and 1994, but
do not much change the point esti-
mates of the second column.
One problem with this first specification
is that it does not account for possible
heterogeneity between school districts
other than from income, enrollment,
and population. Columns 4 and 5 give
the results from a second specification
that uses first differences of the data.
This is a convenient method of including
dummy variables for each school district,
which controls for unobserved differ-
ences between school districts. Holtz-
Eakin (1986) is one of the first applica-
tions of this technique in local public
finance.
Several interesting changes from the
pooled estimates result. First, the point
estimate of the effect of per-capita aid
on property taxes is lowered signifi-
cantly. Without including year effects,
the point estimate for per-capita aid
Y m NN
P = f(yd, E, A(1 + g ), yd E ) + u
10
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drops to –0.48, which is close to
previous flypaper estimates. Inclusion of
year effects drops this point estimate
even further, to –0.28. Second, the
effect of higher per-capita income on
property taxes is much greater; the
coefficient rises from 0.01 to 0.15. Third,
the sign of the income tax-price variable
changes from positive to negative. To a
large extent, these changes reflect the
fact that the district fixed effects
estimates are drawing their explanatory
power from year to year changes within
a district rather than from cross-sectional
differences between districts.
However, the change in sign for the
income-tax price variable may be more
complex than this, as can be seen from
our theoretical discussion in the previous
section. The theoretical model of the
previous section indicates that, apart
from direct aid changes that change the
district budget constraint and any
flypaper effect operating through g , the
Florio tax increase would lead to
relatively lower property taxes for
wealthier school districts, while the
Whitman tax cut would lead to relatively
higher property taxes for these same
districts. To see this, return to the
analysis of Figures 1 and 2. Recall that
those who would have opposed the
Florio tax increase (i.e., those whose
incomes relative to the state average are
greater than their property values
TABLE 2
BASIC REGRESSION RESULTS (t-STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PER-CAPITA PROPERTY TAX
Independent
Variables
Constant
Per-capita aid
Per-capita income
Per-capita enrollment
(E/N)*(yd /Y
m)
1992 dummy
1993 dummy
1994 dummy
1995 dummy
R2
Number of
observations
–0.05
(–1.08)
–0.28
(–5.15)
0.14
(7.24)
6172
(9.16)
–107
(–12.77)
0.34
(4.79)
0.46
(6.23)
–0.01
(–0.22)
0.13
2036
Estimated Coefficients
Pooled
District Fixed Effects
(First Differences)
1991–5
First Difference
1994–5
First Difference
0.00
(–0.21)
0.10
(0.78)
–0.08
(–1.66)
–408
(–1.12)
22
(4.50)
0.10
509
0.29
(2.86)
–0.66
(–4.95)
0.07
(2.50)
7029
(5.02)
–97
(–4.96)
0.08
509
0.13
(5.98)
–0.48
(–10.79)
0.15
(7.62)
4971
(7.77)
–89
(–11.85)
0.10
2036
21.74
(2.38)
–0.84
(–35.85)
0.02
(27.53)
(38.02)
0.67
2545
3668
105.97
(7.79)
–0.76
(–29.72)
0.01
(11.41)
2617
(16.47)
(8.27)
0.68
2545
1199
94.18
(6.41)
–0.76
(–28.96)
0.01
(11.38)
(16.41)
(8.18)
23.24
(2.64)
8.66
(0.99)
17.36
(1.96)
5.87
(0.66)
0.68
2545
1187
2643
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relative to the district average) would
have less income left over to spend on
private goods after the tax increase, and
since lower x implies higher Ux, the
indifference curves pictured in Figure 1
will become flatter for a decisive voter
of this type. That voter will then prefer
lower property taxes. This same voter
would have favored the Whitman tax
cut and would have more income left
after the tax cut to spend on private
goods; since more x implies lower Ux,
the indifference curves of this voter
become steeper after the Whitman tax
cut, as illustrated in Figure 2, which
implies a higher property tax rate.
Hence, the theoretical analysis suggests
that voters with higher income-tax
prices will lower property taxes in
adjusting to the Florio tax increase and
will raise property taxes in adjusting to
the Whitman tax cuts, quite apart from
changes in the budget constraint
pictured in the figures.
Given this explanation, one can interpret
the negative coefficient on the income-
tax price in the district fixed effects
regressions as reflecting primarily an
adjustment to the Florio tax increase.
This explanation can be further investi-
gated by comparing two further
specifications. Column 6 of Table 2 gives
the results of a long first difference of
1991–5. The coefficient on the income-
tax price variable is negative and similar
in magnitude to that of the full first
difference specification, which is
consistent with the explanation that this
period was primarily one of adjustment
to the Florio tax increase. The coefficient
of the aid variable is –0.66 and that of
per-capita income is 0.07, which are in
between the estimates of the pooled
and full first difference approach.
The final column of Table 2 gives the
results from a first difference of 1994–
5, which is arguably primarily influ-
enced by the Whitman tax cuts. The
coefficient on per-capita aid has the
wrong sign and is insignificant. One
might interpret this as changes in aid
having no effect on local property taxes,
but, given the previous estimates, it is
more likely that there is simply not
enough variation so soon after the cuts.
More interesting is that the sign of the
income-tax price variable becomes
significantly positive rather than
negative. This is consistent with the
theoretical proposition that higher
income communities will choose to levy
higher property taxes after the income
tax cuts.
As mentioned earlier, a small empirical
literature in local public finance has
recently started to address the question
of whether increases and decreases in
aid have asymmetrical effects on
spending. As discussed in Gamkhar and
Oates (1996), Gramlich (1987) suggests
that it may be difficult for governments
to cut back on programs with estab-
lished clienteles when aid falls; in this
case, spending does not fall when aid is
cut back. This implies a somewhat
weaker than usual flypaper effect. On
the other hand, Stine (1994) notes that
an alternative type of asymmetry is fiscal
retrenchment; governments may tighten
their belts when aid is cut back. This
might lead to a more powerful than
usual flypaper effect. Empirically, Stine
finds a super flypaper effect that even
reverses the expected sign of the aid
coefficient; he finds that lower aid in
Pennsylvania counties was accompanied
by lower local revenues. In contrast,
Gamkhar and Oates find no asymme-
tries in state and local spending in
response to changes in federal grants.
Table 3 adds to the specifications of
Table 2 two additional right-hand-side
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variables to test for an asymmetrical
response: a dummy variable for positive
aid and the interaction of this dummy
variable with per-capita aid. The results
indicate that the specification is impor-
tant in identifying asymmetric re-
sponses; at least one specification is
supportive of each of the three possibili-
ties suggested above.
The results of the pooled regression
indicate a significant positive coefficient
for the interaction term, although it is
small in magnitude. The change in per-
capita property taxes for a one unit
change in per-capita aid is –0.80 for
decreases in aid and –0.72 for increases
in aid. This is consistent with Gramlich’s
hypothesis. The district fixed effects
specification leads to some interesting
changes. First, the sign of the interac-
tion coefficient is reversed. Although the
coefficient of the interaction term in the
specification without year fixed effects is
insignificant, it is significant when year
dummies are included. Moreover, the
magnitude of the coefficient is high; the
change in per-capita property taxes for a
one unit change in per-capita aid is
–0.14 for decreases in aid and –0.56 for
TABLE 3
ASYMMETRY EFFECTS (t-STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PER-CAPITA PROPERTY TAX
Independent
Variables
Constant
Per-capita aid
Per-capita income
Per-capita enrollment
(E/N)*(y/Y m)
Dummy ( D  aid ³ 0)
Dummy ( D  aid ³ 0)
*Per-capita aid
1993 dummy
1994 dummy
1995 dummy
R2
Number of
observations
Estimated Coefficients
Pooled
District Fixed Effects
(First Differences)
1991–5
First Difference
1994–5
First Difference
–0.40
(–0.21)
0.10
(0.74)
–0.08
(–1.67)
–412
(–1.13)
2207
(4.50)
–2.89
(–0.32)
0.53
(0.40)
0.10
509
45.59
(2.54)
–0.43
(–1.69)
0.07
(2.50)
7090
(5.05)
–9653
(–4.92)
–35.27
(–1.15)
–0.11
(–0.26)
0.07
509
–13.06
(–1.50)
–0.14
(–1.57)
0.14
(7.29)
6176
(9.19)
–10805
(–12.90)
18.29
(2.41)
–0.42
(–3.48)
40.80
(5.19)
59.70
(6.79)
7.65
(0.85)
0.14
2036
10.29
(2.95)
–0.49
(–6.33)
0.15
(7.83)
4943
(7.73)
–8919
(–11.89)
12.46
(2.28)
–0.15
(–1.29)
0.10
2036
103.83
(5.38)
–0.80
(–21.15)
0.01
(10.95)
2663
(14.07)
1050
(6.16)
–7.32
(–0.61)
0.08
(2.13)
–5.66
(–0.55)
4.93
(0.42)
–11.85
(–1.13)
0.67
2036
101.61
(5.93)
–0.79
(–21.85)
0.01
(10.99)
2639
(14.09)
1059
(6.22)
–7.68
(–0.71)
0.08
(2.08)
0.66
2036
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increases in aid. This is consistent with
the direction of Stine’s finding, although
it is not supportive of the notion that
cuts in aid lead to reductions in local
revenue. The final two first difference
specifications (for 1991–5 and 1994–5)
yield insignificant coefficients on the
interaction term. These specifications as
well as the district fixed effects specifica-
tion without year fixed effects indicate
no significant asymmetric response.
Conclusions
New Jersey enacted an income tax in
1976 in response to a State Supreme
Court ruling that local taxation alone
violated the requirement of the State
Constitution that all children receive a
thorough and efficient education. The
law creating an income tax in New
Jersey required that revenues from the
New Jersey income tax be dedicated
solely to relief of local property taxes;
most of the relief is given as aid to local
school districts. The state aid and
income tax system has since undergone
a series of changes reflecting the back
and forth debate between elected
officials and the State Supreme Court.
The most recent changes include a large
increase in the income tax and a
restructuring of aid to local school
districts by then Governor Florio in 1990
and Governor Whitman’s cuts in the
state income tax beginning in 1994.
Governor Whitman’s cuts have led to
some fear that local property taxes
would simply rise dollar for dollar in
response to the state income tax cuts.
This paper investigates the effect on
local property taxes of changes in aid
resulting from the income tax increase
under Governor Florio and the begin-
ning of the decrease in income taxes
under Governor Whitman. We begin by
developing a simple public choice
model, based on the general equilibrium
models developed in Westhoff (1977),
Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1984), and
Goodspeed (1989), in which both local
property taxes and state income taxes
are choice variables. The model incorpo-
rates two avenues for a flypaper
response: a direct effect of aid on the
budget constraint and Fisher’s (1979)
explanation that income and property
taxes present voters with different tax
prices. The model is also used to analyze
Fischel’s (1989) argument that the
interaction between voters’ decisions
and court mandates is important in
understanding school district financing
issues
This theoretical model is used as the
basis for an estimating equation that
relates school district aid and property
taxes. This equation is then estimated
using disaggregated data on New Jersey
school districts for the fiscal years 1991–
5 for four empirical specifications. The
specifications are a pooled regression, a
regression with district fixed effects, a
long 1991–5 first difference, and a short
1994–5 first difference. Since the data
include both increases and decreases in
aid, we can also test for asymmetry in
the reaction of governments, as
suggested in the work of Gramlich
(1987), Stine (1994), and Gamkhar and
Oates (1996).
The results suggest that a flypaper effect
seems to be present so that property
taxes did not fall dollar for dollar when
income taxes were raised, and are likely
to rise significantly less than dollar for
dollar when income taxes are cut.
Second, the theory indicates and the
empirical evidence tends to confirm that
higher income districts will choose
greater decreases in property taxes than
other districts when an undesired
income tax rise is imposed, and will
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choose to increase property taxes more
than other districts when the income tax
is reduced. The asymmetry results are
mixed: the specification with district and
year fixed effects (arguably the most
complete specification) indicates that
property taxes rise less when aid
decreases than they fall when aid
increases, but the pooled specification
suggests the opposite, and the other
specifications yield insignificant results.
One avenue for further research is a more
detailed investigation of some of the
fiscal illusion explanations in New Jersey.
Two institutional details of New Jersey
school districts may lead to some
interesting fiscal illusion tests. The first is
the already mentioned budget cap, which
can be overridden with a vote; we have
assumed in this paper that voters are
rational and hence reveal their prefer-
ences by voting to override if they so
desire. However, it might be interesting to
investigate the reversion hypothesis in this
context since a defeated budget would
normally revert to the previous year’s
budget. A second institutional detail is
that New Jersey school districts can elect
(by referendum) to have their budgets
decided by representative democracy
rather than by referendum; this creates
two types of districts commonly referred
to as “type one” and “type two”
districts. It might be interesting to see if
fiscal illusion types of explanations are
more powerful in one type or the other.
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1 For fiscal year 1994, for instance, total revenue
collected from the New Jersey individual income
tax amounted to $4,494 million.  This amount was
transferred to the Property Tax Relief Fund, which,
along with a small surplus from previous years, had
a balance of $4,597 million.  Of this amount,
$3,828 million, or about 83 percent of the
Property Tax Relief Fund, was given to local school
districts for educational spending.  Of the
remaining amount, $330 million was refunded to
individuals in the form of homestead rebates, and
$440 million was given as aid to municipalities.
2 One of the earliest empirical studies is that of
Gramlich and Galper (1973).  Reviews of the
literature can be found in Fisher (1982) and Hines
and Thaler (1995) (see also the interesting
discussion in Oates, 1994).
3 See Bogart, Bradford, and Williams (1992) for an
examination of the incidence of the Florio tax
increase.
4 See also Fernandez and Rogerson (1997) for a
dynamic version of this model. Nechyba (1997)
uses a different model that essentially restricts the
property tax to be a tax on a fixed factor. The
property tax in his model is therefore equivalent to
a head tax and, not surprisingly, his simulation
results comparing income and property tax
equilibria are very similar to those of Goodspeed
(1989), who compares income and head tax
equilibria. Unfortunately, Nechyba was unaware of
this earlier work and consequently does not
compare the results.
5 An interesting survey by Ross and Yinger (1995)
indicates that urban bid-price models are in many
ways equivalent to the structure of Epple, Filimon,
and Romer (1984).
6 This is the approach taken in Goodspeed (1995).
See also de Bartolome (1997), who uses a serial
voting procedure to analyze the structure of state
aid formulas.  An interesting alternative approach
is Leyden (1992), who uses an expected vote
maximization model.
7 It is also similar to the analysis in Goodspeed
(1995), who uses a serial voting procedure to show
that an asymmetric distribution of income (which
implies differing income and head tax prices for
the median voter) may lead local governments to
choose income over head taxation, in spite of the
migration inefficiency that such a choice entails.
See also Silva and Sonstelie (1995), who argue that
different deductibility rules of taxes used by the
state and taxes used by local governments led to
different tax prices in California.
8 This illustrates a point made in Hoxby (1996, 1997)
that even lump-sum grants can have price effects if
one takes into account the effect of such grants on
the housing market.  It is also interesting to note
the similarity to the analysis of Epple and Romano
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(1996), who analyze the effect of vouchers when
schools are financed by an income tax.  In their
model, it is the exit of people from consumption of
public schools (who must continue to pay taxes to
support the public school system) that creates a
nonlinear budget constraint.
9 Federal aid to New Jersey school districts is
extremely small for these years.
10 If part of the tax base is commercial and industrial
property, Ladd’s (1975) point, that the composition
of the property tax base may be important for the
political economy of the property tax, may be
relevant.  If commerce and industry have a large
amount of political power and generally push for
positions favored by relatively wealthy individuals,
the justification for using mean rather than median
values may be strengthened.  An alternative view is
Fischel’s (1975) argument that property taxes on
businesses compensate the decisive voter for
disamenities associated with business location.
11 New Jersey school districts are subject to a budget
cap that attempts to prohibit increases beyond the
increase in per-capita income.  However, a school
district may obtain a cap waiver if the voters of the
district approve a budget increase.  A cap waiver
may also be obtained (without a vote) for
increased enrollment, increases in special
education costs, and tuition paid to special needs
districts (see New Jersey Department of Education,
1995).  Since the budget cap is waived by a vote,
voters reveal their preferences, and the cap is not
considered a binding constraint in the econometric
model that follows.  Merriman (1987) examines a
sample of New Jersey municipalities and finds that
a budget cap had little effect.
12 One possible explanation for the smaller than
expected flypaper effect is that lower aid is
simultaneously accompanied by higher after-tax
income; since the two variables are negatively
correlated, we might observe a smaller flypaper
effect than otherwise.
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APPENDIX
As mentioned in the text, the audit worksheet
provides information on local property tax revenues
and state aid by school district, which I was able to
obtain for the years 1991–5. However, information on
population, enrollment, and income was not available
for all years and some years had to be constructed
through interpolation and extrapolation.
The data provided by the New Jersey Department of
Education includes school district population for 1990
and 1992, enrollment for 1991, 1992, 1993, and
1994, and income per capita for 1993. District
enrollment was projected to 1995 from the growth of
the district’s enrollment during 1993–4.
Population for 1991 was taken as the average of the
district’s population in 1990 and 1992. For 1993,
1994, and 1995, a state population growth rate was
constructed from New Jersey state level data. These
growth rates were then used to project a district’s
population in 1993, 1994, and 1995. Similarly, state
income growth rates were constructed for 1991,
1992, 1994, and 1995 from state level data. These
growth rates were used to project figures for income
for years other than 1993.
Nominal dollar values were converted to real dollar
values by deflating by the CPI for the appropriate
period; fiscal year CPI values were constructed from
the commonly available annual index.
